Introduction
It is well understood that, if one holds the marginal benefit of lobbying to a particular industry constant, then the presence of a free-rider problem in lobbying will reduce the amount of lobbying which firms in that industry will undertake.
1 This argument, however, can be turned around. If the free-rider problem in lobbying is very serious, but a significant amount of lobbying nevertheless occurs, it must be the case that the marginal benefit of lobbying to the industry is very large. This paper underscores this point by considering its implications for a reform in rent seeking. Specifically, we argue that, if rent seeking and lobbying involve similar skills, and there is a free-rider problem in lobbying, then a reform which drives individuals out of rent seeking can have surprisingly large adverse feedback effects through increased lobbying.
It is generally believed that lobbying, but not rent seeking, is often subject to a free-rider problem. 2 For example, a tariff provides benefits to all firms in an industry, not just the firms that lobbied for it (Olson (1965) , Rodrik (1986) ). On the other hand, rent seeking is an activity whose benefits are usually both rival and excludable. For example, when one person receives a valuable import license, that license is denied to others. 3 We consider a model with lobbying and rent seeking, where rents arise as a by-product of policies put in place by lobbying. When firms lobby for import protection in the form of quotas, for example, rent seeking arises as a side effect of the policy. 4 We assume there are specialized skills common to lobbying and rent seeking within a given industry, so that these activities are much more substitutable for one another than either is with productive activity. As a result, a reform which discourages rent seeking will drive rent seekers into lobbying. This will increase lobby-induced transfers.
The free-rider problem in lobbying, moreover, implies that the marginal benefit of lobbying to the industry will significantly exceed the wage paid by the firm to the lobbyist, and so, will also significantly exceed the marginal return in rent seeking. 5 Thus, the increase in lobby-induced transfers may greatly exceed the initial fall in rents. That is, under some circumstances, a reform which reduces available rents can lead to an increase in the sum total of rents plus lobby-induced transfers to the industry. Of course, the increased lobbying may also partly offset the initial fall in rents, since these rents are a by-product of the increased lobbying.
Reforms which target lobbying, on the other hand, directly reduce distortions associated with the policies put in place by the lobbying process. If rents are positively associated with the lobby-induced policies, rents will also be reduced by such a reform. This suggests that reform which targets the policy making process may be much more effective than reforms targeting rent seeking alone.
Consider the example of a domestic industry lobbying for protection through a combination of tariffs and quotas. If there are many firms in the protected industry, then there will be a free-rider problem in lobbying. 6 Moreover, to the extent that protection is achieved partially through quotas, rent seeking will result, as people try to get valuable import licenses. If lobbyists and rent seekers have similar sector-specific knowledge (e.g., about policies, particular bureaucrats or lawmakers, etc.) then there might be significant movement between lobbying and rent seeking in this sector. 7 In this context, reforms targeted at rent seeking might include tariffication, i.e., the replacement of quotas by their tariff equivalent. 8, 9 Reforms targeted at lobbying could reflect institutional changes (e.g., changes in the rules governing administered protection) or changes in the party in power.
Alternative interpretations of the "rent seeking" activity are also possible. For example, lobbying may create a program, regulation or direct transfer to benefit a specific group. In this case, rent-seeking activities may include positions in the bureaucracy required to administer the program. Krueger (1990) in her discussion of the U.S. sugar program notes that bureaucrats acquire human capital specific to the programs which they administer, and that they may move between positions in the bureaucracy and positions as lobbyists. As with rents in the trade regime, positions in the bureaucracy may arise as a by-product of a program, created through 4 lobbying, for the benefit of a specific industry. In this situation, "reform" of rent seeking consists of an exogenous reduction in the size of the bureaucracy.
We are thus assuming that the labor market for lobbyists/rent seekers is segmented (in the short run) from the market for productive labor services, due to the existence of sector specific human capital. Lobbyists, rent seekers, bureaucrats, and former elected officials may all form part of the labor pool for this market. When shocks hit the political system (e.g. reforms), participants in this labor market will substitute away from activities where their returns have fallen, and into closely related activities where their productivity is (initially) unaffected by the shock. The feedback effects which arise because of this adjustment in the labor market are the central focus of this paper. In particular, we show that the existence of a free-rider problem in lobbying may make these feedback effects surprisingly large.
The type of labor market interaction we have in mind is reflected in the following quote from Rodrik (1994: 86, footnote 6):
"If individuals can waste resources competing for the rents generated by, say, quotas, they can also waste resources lobbying the government for the reimposition of quotas that have been taken away. Altering the incentives for rent-seeking behavior goes beyond simple changes in the level of trade protection."
The model implicit in Rodrik's quote differs from ours in that it ignores free riding and it considers rent creation an end achieved through lobbying (i.e., people lobby to create rents which they later seek), while in our model, rent creation is simply a potential by-product of transfer seeking. However, the quote is consistent with the larger point that an analysis of reform must consider the range of alternative unproductive activities into which rent seekers may move.
The basic model is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we look at reforms targeting the rent-seeking activity, assuming a special case where the level of rents does not respond to the level of the lobbying activity. These reforms result in increased lobbying activity as labor moves out of rent seeking and into lobbying. They therefore create negative feedback effects in the form of greater lobby-induced transfers. We provide an in-depth analysis of the conditions under 5 which these feedback effects are large in Section 4. We analyze rent-seeking reform in the more general case where the level of rents depends on the level of the lobbying activity in Section 5. In Section 6, we consider lobby reform and find that the free-rider problem has no special implications for the analysis of this type of reform. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We first examine lobbying, then turn to the rent-seeking activity and the full equilibrium. 10 Consider an industry consisting of n identical firms, indexed by i = 1, 2, ..., n, with n fixed exogenously. Firm i hires an amount of lobbying services s i , in order to convince the government to confer benefits to the industry. For ease of exposition, we refer to the benefits conferred upon the industry as "transfers", but these benefits may stem from tariffs, regulatory policy, or any other government action which confers benefits on the whole industry. The total transfers to the industry are given by,
where B ' > 0, B'' < 0. 11 That is, the total benefits to the industry are increasing in the total lobbying effort, but the marginal benefit is diminishing. Here A is a shift parameter which will be reduced by a reform targeting the lobbying activity. Also, α(n) is a factor which determines how transfers vary with n, holding lobbying effort constant. For example, if lobbying provides a nonrivalrous public good, then α(n)=n, while if lobbying is perfectly rivalrous, α(n)=1. The role of this function (and the β(n) function introduced in equation (5) below) will not be developed fully until our discussion in Section 4 on how n affects the comparative statics of the model.
Under symmetry, firm i gets exactly 1/n of the total benefits to the industry (this is the source of the free-rider problem). If the wage to lobbying services is w, then firm i's objective function is 6 (2) ( )
In the cooperative equilibrium, firms collectively maximize (2), acting as if n=1. In the noncooperative equilibrium each firm maximizes (2) taking other firm's lobbying efforts as given. The respective first order conditions are given by,
In the symmetric noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game, s i = s j = s. This allows us to rewrite (3b) as (4) ( )
This is the optimization condition for the transfer-seeking activity in the noncooperative equilibrium.
Next, assume that, as a kind of spillover effect, the distortions created by the lobbying also generate rents available for rent seeking. If these rents are also a function of total lobbying, we can express them as 12 (5) ),
where θ is a shift parameter which will be reduced by a reform which targets the rent-seeking activity, and β(n) determines how rents vary with the number of lobbying firms n, holding total lobbying by those firms constant.
We now specify the rent-seeking game. Assume rents are sought by a fixed set of m rentseeking firms. Also, assume that the fraction of rents received by rent-seeking firm j is , where r j is rent seeking/lobbying labor hired by firm j and 1 0 < < µ is a productivity parameter. 13 Thus, rent-seeking firm j chooses r j to maximize
. We focus on a symmetric equilibrium (r i = r k ), and find
There are a total of L rent seekers/lobbyists of whom ns are engaged in lobbying and mr in rent seeking. By labor market clearing, we have mr=L-ns. Substitute this into the expression above and allow the number of rent-seeking firms
14 This gives
If rent seeking and lobbying activities are perfect substitutes, then the right-hand side of (6) should be equal to the left-hand side of (4) in equilibrium. This yields
This is the basic equilibrium condition which determines s as a function of the parameters A, θ, n, α(n), β(n), µ, and L.
The main focus of our analysis is the short run. We assume that there are skills specific to rent-seeking/lobbying activities, and that these activities are more highly substitutable with one another than either is with productive activities. Thus, L is fixed in the short run. 15 We do not explicitly analyze the transition to the long run. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that in the long run the total number of lobbyists/rent seekers, L, will respond to changes in wages in the rent seeking/lobbying sector. The speed of movement into or out of this 8 sector (dL/dt) should depend positively on the gap between the current wage, w, and the longrun equilibrium wage, w , as in
where, . 0 ) 0 ( and 0 ' = > g g 16 The wage w reflects both the competitive wage in the productive sector of the economy and the premium necessary to compensate individuals for the accumulation of sector specific skills.
Note that the long-run equilibrium in this model is unique. The long run wage is w , while the marginal benefit from lobbying in (4) is monotonically decreasing in the level of lobbying. As a result, the long-run level of lobbying is unique. This level of lobbying determines the level of rents R(ns). With the level of rents and the long run wage w given, there will be a unique analytical solution to the rent seeking game.
Rent Seeking Reform: A Special Case
In this section we examine the effect of reforms when lobbying affects only the benefits to the industry, without affecting total rents to rent seekers, so R'(ns) = 0. Though this case is somewhat unrealistic, it illustrates the underlying points more clearly. In Section 5, we consider the case . 0 ) ( ' ≠ ns R Our focus here is on the feedback effects which result from reforms of the rent seeking sector. To understand these feedback effects, it is useful to break these effects down into two components. First, because of the free-rider problem in lobbying, the marginal benefit of lobbying for the industry as a whole is n times the lobbyist wage, w. Thus, for each worker moved into lobbying, the change in transfers is given by
Note that this is just a slight rewrite of the first order condition in (4). Thus, if n is large, then the sensitivity of transfers to the number of lobbyists is many times larger than the wage to lobbyists.
The second component is the number of workers who move out of rent seeking into lobbying in response to a reform which reduces available rents. First, it will prove useful to define, using (4), the elasticity of demand for lobbyists, ε, as follows: 
Next, rearranging equation (7), we have )
To examine the effect of a reform in the rent seeking sector, we set dA = 0. Also, in this section,
. Thus, we can rewrite R ns ( ) as the constant R . Solving (11), and rearranging using equation (4) and our definition of ε in (10) then gives (12)
This gives the sensitivity of the number of lobbyists, ns, to total rents available, θR. The negative sign of this expression indicates that people move out of rent seeking into lobbying when rents are reduced. The expression in (12) will be small if ε is small, since in this case the demand for lobbyists is inelastic. Similarly, (12) will be small if the rent-seeking sector, L-ns, is large compared with the lobbying sector, ns. A small lobbying sector has less ability to absorb labor than a large sector.
Imagine, for example, that the size of the rent-seeking sector L-ns = 100 and that ε =1.
Consider an exogenous 20% reduction in rents so that if no labor moved out of the rent-seeking sector, wages would fall 20% in that sector. If ns = 5, a 20% reduction in wages would induce the hiring of one more lobbyist. If ns = 100, the same reduction in wages would result in the hiring of 20 more lobbyists. Of course in equilibrium, wages will fall by less than 20%, but it is clear that the larger sector will absorb more labor for any given change in w.
Due to the existence of free riding in lobbying, the shift of rent seekers into lobbying can yield surprisingly large increases in transfers. The total feedback effect on lobbying from a reduction in rents is given by equation (9) times equation (12): ( )
Since (9) is large, the total effect, (13), will be large unless (12) is small. We will discuss the size of (13) further in Section 4.
The total change in rents plus transfers, θR+AB(ns), per unit change in rents, θR, is
. This is given by,
( ) ( )
The first term on the right-hand side reflects the one-for-one reduction in rents, which is the direct impact of the reform. The second term on the right captures the feedback effects which result as individuals move out of rent seeking and into lobbying. The sign on (14) is ambiguous.
If it is positive, a reform (a reduction in θR) will reduce the sum of transfers plus rents, as one would normally expect. We now consider the cooperative and noncooperative cases in turn.
First, perfect cooperation in lobbying is equivalent to having a single firm in the industry, i.e., n=1. In this case, the second term on the right is less than 1, so (14) will be positive. Thus, a reform will reduce the sum of rents plus transfers.
However, with noncooperative lobbying and n > 1, it is possible for the second term to dominate the first, and for the sum of rents plus transfers to rise as a result of a reform. Thus, consideration of the free-rider problem raises the possibility of a perverse outcome from a reform of the rent-seeking sector.
Proposition 1: If firms behave noncooperatively and
, then a reform which reduces rents will raise the sum of rents plus transfers.
This follows immediately from equation (14). Proposition 1 shows that a reform in rent seeking can have perverse short term effects, though only in the presence of a free-rider problem.
However, a reform which reduces rents may reduce wages to rent seekers/lobbyists, and thus in the long term drive them out of these activities into more productive pursuits. To determine the extent of the fall in wages, we need to examine the effect of a reduction in θ on the wage, w, to rent seeker/lobbyists. To do this, differentiate (4) and combine with (7), (12) and our definition of ε in (10) to obtain,
This expression is positive, so a reform which reduces θ lowers w, as one would expect.
Moreover, this elasticity depends on the size of the lobbying sector relative to rent seeking, ns/ [L-ns] . In particular, the larger the rent-seeking sector is relative to the lobbying sector, the larger the effect on wages of a reform which targets rent seeking. Also, higher values of ε imply smaller effects of reform on the wage since, in this case, the lobbying sector more easily absorbs the labor pushed out of the rent-seeking activity. The number of firms in the industry (and therefore the extent of the free-rider problem) has no independent implications for the effect of a rent-seeking reform on wages.
One issue we have not addressed in our model is the possibility of lobbying against the transfer sought by the industry in question. 17 There may be a significant number of instances in which there is no organized opposition, and of course in this case, lobbying may be particularly effective (Rosenthal (1993: 220) ). This type of lobbying often manifests itself in the attachment of obscure riders to larger bills. If there is opposition to the lobbying effort, and if both sides represent economic interests, then the mechanism described in this paper will tend to have less force, with the ultimate results depending on each side's elasticity of demand for lobbyists. If the opposition represents an ideological interest as opposed to an economic interest, then this opposition may draw on a different pool of labor for its lobbyists. To the extent it does, the results derived in this section will remain relevant. Rosenthal (1993: 28-35 ) describes the career paths of contract lobbyists, association lobbyists, and cause lobbyists. These paths tend to be distinct, so that each group may tend to form a separate labor pool. Our model is best considered a model of contract or association lobbyists. Further analysis incorporating lobbying against the transfer, however, may be a useful topic for future research.
Determinants of the Size of the Feedback Effect
We have established that a reform which targets rent-seeking activity results in a feedback effect in the form of increased transfers. From (13), this feedback effect is given by
13
Note that n places an upper bound on the size of the feedback effect. In limiting cases where either the relative size of the rent seeking sector (L-ns)/ns is very small, or the elasticity of demand for lobbyists ε is very high, the feedback effect is precisely n. There are no strong a priori reasons to believe that the elasticity of demand for lobbyists differs systematically with the number of firms n. In fact, if the transfer function takes the simple form AB(ns) φ , ε is constant at φ/(1-φ). In this case, the size of the feedback effect across sectors will depend solely on φ, n and (L-ns)/ns.
When making comparisons across different sectors of the economy, the relative size of the rent-seeking sector may vary for industry specific reasons which are orthogonal to n. To the extent that they are observable, a policy maker who wishes to estimate the size across sectors of the feedback effect from rent seeking reform may substitute n, (L-ns)/ns and an estimate of ε into equation (16). If n is large, and ns and L-ns are of a similar magnitude (or if ns > L-ns), then by (16), the feedback effect will be large.
With this in mind, it is still interesting to ask whether there are any systematic effects of n on the size of the feedback effect. An increase in n raises the numerator of (16), but may also have effects on the relative size of the rent-seeking sector, [L-ns]/ns; when this ratio rises, the feedback effect shrinks. This suggests a possible ambiguity in the relationship between n and the magnitude of the effect in (16).
As we will see, we cannot determine the relationship between n and the feedback effect without placing the issue in a specific context. To do so, consider an example from the trade regime, where firms lobby for protection from foreign producers through the use of quotas, and rents arise as a side effect of the quotas. Further, assume that the lobbying process determines the domestic price, and that quotas are adjusted so as to achieve this price target. 18 In the context of this example, we will consider two alternative ways to model an increase in n.
Case 1: Lobbying as a rival public good
First consider an increase in n where total industry capital and total industry demand are held constant. As a result, each firm in the industry becomes smaller when n increases. The market supply curve is therefore held constant as n rises, as are (for a given level of lobbying) imports and quota rents. The invariance of rents with respect to n implies that 0 ) ( ' = n β . As n rises, the benefit to each firm from a given tariff falls, since this benefit is proportional to firm size. As a result, lobbying provides a rival public good, which corresponds to α(n) =1. Differentiation of equation (4) with α(n) =1 reveals that 0 / < dn dns ; an increase in n will be associated with a decrease in lobbying activity. Further, since an increase in n has no independent effect on rents, we are guaranteed that the ratio of rent seekers to lobbyists, [L -ns]/ns, will rise with n.
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Therefore, increases in n will have an ambiguous impact on the feedback effect in (16), since the numerator and denominator will both increase.
For concreteness, let transfers be AB(ns) = A(ns)
φ and let rents be independent of n, so 0 ) ( ' = n β . Also, begin at a long-run equilibrium where w w = . We then have the following: Proposition 2: When transfers are a rival public good given by A(ns) φ and 0 ) ( ' = n β , the feedback effect will increase in n if and only if the lobbying sector is larger than the rentseeking sector (ns > L-ns).
Proof: Since w w = and 0
The sign of the derivative of (17) with respect to n is the same as the sign of (18)
The sign of (18) For small n it is possible that an increase in n will increase the size of the feedback effect.
However, the expression is (18) will clearly be negative if n is sufficiently large since ns is decreasing in n, while L-ns does not vary with n in the long-run equilibrium. Thus, for this parametric example, the feedback effect must eventually get smaller as n rises. This reflects the rapid reduction in lobbying activity which occurs as n rises.
Case 2: Lobbying as a pure public good. Now consider the trade example, where an increase in n represents entry by a new firm which brings new capital into the domestic industry. Thus, the market supply curve shifts out as a result of this change. Since the domestic price (determined in the lobbying process) is constant, at the original level of lobbying, imports (and quota rents) must fall. If the new firm is the same size as existing firms, then the benefit it receives from the tariff is identical to the benefit received by the preexisting firms in the industry. This is the case of lobbying as a pure public good, which corresponds to α(n) =n, where rents are nonincreasing in n. For this case we have the following proposition: Proposition 3: When transfers are a pure public good given by nA(ns) φ , and rents are nonincreasing in n so 0 ) ( ' ≤ n β , the feedback effect is monotonically increasing in the number of firms n.
Proof: Substitute w w = and α(n) =n into (4) and differentiate to find that 0 / = dn dns ;
the number of lobbyists hired is independent of the number of firms in the industry.
Further, since 0 ) ( ' ≤ n β , the level of the rent seeking activity relative to lobbying (L-ns/ns) either falls or remains constant. As a result, the numerator of (16) It is worth noting that both case 1 and case 2 have been consider previously in the literature on the political economy of trade (see Rodrik [1986] and Hillman [1991] ). The two cases discussed above do not exhaust the possibilities. There may be other examples in which lobbying is a pure public good, but where an increase in n would be associated with an increase in rents. This would again give us an ambiguous relationship between the feedback effect in (16) and the number of firms in the industry. Thus, while we can say that the potential size of the feedback effect is increasing in n, we cannot definitively state that the feedback is larger in industries with a greater number of firms.
Rent Seeking Reform: The General Case
In this section we allow for spillover effects of lobbying on the level of rents available to rent seekers, so that R'(ns) ≠ 0 in equation (11). Setting dA = 0 in (11) gives,
Here, R ns d ( ) θ is the direct effect of the reform on rents, i.e., the effect of a fall in θ if ns, and so, R(ns) is held constant. Thus
is the movement of labor per dollar of direct effect of the reform. Using calculations similar to those in (14) we find the effect of reform on the sum of rents plus transfers to be given by
This is the total effect on rents and transfers ( d R ns AB ns
Similarly, we obtain the following expression for dlnw/dlnθ: , equations (19) and (20) reduce to equations (14) and (15). The extra term
(1/w) ) ( ' ns R θ represents the increase in rents when $1 worth of labor is moved into lobbying.
Proposition 4 follows immediately from (19):
Proposition 4: In the model where rents depend on the level of lobbying
firms behave noncooperatively and
The condition in Proposition 4 is identical to the one stated in Proposition 1.
When R'> 0, the magnitude of (19) will be reduced. The reason is that, when θ falls, movement out of rent seeking into lobbying is self limiting. Greater lobbying increases rent availability, making it more attractive to remain in the rent-seeking activity. On the other hand, from (20), it can be seen that if R'>0 then a reform of rent seeking will put less downward pressure on wages to rent seeker/lobbyists, because the additional lobbying induced by the reform partially offsets the initial fall in rents.
To see this more clearly, note from (19) and (20) that
In Section 4 we identified conditions under which there might be very large negative feedback effects resulting from reforms targeted at rent seeking. The conditions require that n be large, L-ns be the same order of magnitude as ns and that ε not be small. Under these conditions, the factor in parentheses in (21) will be large, and there will be a large rise in rents plus transfers, unless d w d ln / lnθ is small. On the other hand, if the reduction in wages is small, then (8) implies that there will be a sluggish exit from the rent-seeking/lobbying sector. This will happen if R'(ns) is very big. Thus, when the conditions identified in Section 4 hold, there are two possibilities. Either ) ( ' ns R is small in which case there will be a large negative feedback effect increasing transfers, or ) ( ' ns R is large in which case reform is ineffective in driving people out of the rent seeking/lobbying sector of the economy.
If R'<0, then the derivatives in (19) and (20) by reducing imports, has the potential to reduce quota rents available to rent seekers.
Lobby Reform
We now turn briefly to a reform in lobbying. We model reform of the lobbying sector as a reduction in A. This may reflect changes in the lobbying law as regards disclosure requirements, gifts and the like. It may also reflect a change of the party in power, or a fundamental change in governing beliefs of a party in power (e.g., the trade liberalization undertaken by the PRI in Mexico in the 1980s). We are interested in whether the existence of the free-rider problem per se has any surprising implications for the effects of lobbying reform. The direct effect of this reform is that, holding lobbying constant, transfers to the industry are reduced. The indirect effect occurs as lobbyists are pushed out of lobbying, into the rent-seeking activity, further reducing transfers to the industry. The existence of the free-rider problem in lobbying leads us to focus on this indirect effect because it implies that the marginal product of a lobbyist to the industry is substantially above the wage received by lobbyists. Therefore, we will take the ratio of the indirect to the direct effect of lobby reform, and see if the free-rider problem as measured by the number of firms n has any independent implications for the magnitude of this ratio. For simplicity, we return to the assumption 0 ) ( ' = ns R .
To calculate how much labor moves out of lobbying in response to a reform, use equation (11), setting 0 ) ( ' = ns R and dθ = 0 , and also use our definition of ε from (10), to get
The direct effect of lobby reform (i.e., the effect on transfers holding lobbying constant), is given by B ns dA ( ) . The indirect effect reflects the movement out of lobbying in response to the reform, and is given by dns ns AB ns AdB ) ( ' ) ( = . Thus, the ratio of the indirect to direct effect is given by There does not appear to be an independent role for the number of firms, n. . Thus, there is no independent effect of the free-rider problem on the size of this ratio. The free-rider problem does not have any surprising implications for the effects of lobby reform. This is because two factors have opposite effects: (a) free riding implies that any movement out of lobbying will reduce transfers by a large amount, but (b) the direct effect of a reduction in A on payments to lobbyists, wns, will be very small compared to the direct effect on total transfers, AB(ns), so a lobbying reform may not actually move many lobbyists out of lobbying.
Though the indirect effects of lobby reform are not surprisingly large, they may reinforce the direct effects of such a reform. Since rents may arise as a by-product of transfer seeking (see the previous section), reforms targeting the lobbying activity may also reduce rents. Thus, such reforms may be quite effective in reducing rents plus transfers, and ultimately in moving individuals out of the rent seeking/lobbying sector into the productive sector of the economy.
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However, the extent of the free-rider problem in lobbying has no independent implications for the effects of lobby reform.
Conclusion
While our model captures some potentially important aspects of political-economic interaction, it is incomplete in some important ways. We do not specify within the model the process which drives an initial reform, and so cannot determine what ultimately causes reforms to fail. 21 Still, to succeed it seems reasonable to assume that reforms need to create quick and visible gains from improved efficiency, and need to establish a constituency for maintaining, and continuing with the reform process. Quickly moving agents out of the rent-seeking/lobbying sector will both erode the constituency which opposes reform, and help build a new constituency which supports reform. Thus, the negative feedback effects of rent seeking reform identified in this paper may be significant in understanding why many reforms fail. These feedback effects may lead to increased distortions associated with lobby-induced transfers and a sluggish exit from the rent-seeking/lobbying sector.
Our model may help explain the type of policy cycle identified by Bhagwati (1978) and Krueger (1978) in which attempts to liberalize trade in developing countries were often followed by relapses into highly distorted trade regimes. Only rarely were reforms successfully sustained so as to result in the maintenance of a (relatively) liberal trading regime. In the context of our model, "lobby" reform is more deep seated than "rent seeking" reform, and is consistent with the long term success of liberalization attempts. "Lobby" reform reflects true regime shifts, while "rent-seeking" reform may reflect actions due to outside pressures (e.g., the IMF) or a temporary fiscal crisis, when the underlying attitudes of the government in power are unchanged.
Our model is not meant to imply that reform of rent-seeking activities should not be undertaken, only that if such reforms are not part of a larger regime shift, then they will be prone to failure. In fact, the analysis suggests that great care is needed in the design of policy to prevent rent seeking from occurring in the first place. Once human capital has been sunk into such activities, reform will become quite difficult.
In trying to understand the response to reform, human capital specificity must be taken into account. When targeting a reform at rent-seeking activities, it is important to ask where the people engaged in those activities will go in response. It is likely that they will attempt to apply their specialized skills to closely related activities, such as lobbying. The feedback effect from reform of the rent-seeking activity may be of particular importance due to the existence of a free-22 rider problem in the lobbying activity. Thus, broad based reforms which target the transfer generating process directly (i.e., lobby reform), may have fewer adverse side effects, and so, may be more likely to succeed than reforms which only target rents which are a by-product of the lobby-induced transfers.
